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of making them abstract. The tendency to abstraction and separation is a result of a reaction from the excesses of historical empiricism. In France the historical spirit has never been strong, and the more recent development of the nation has done nothing to foster it. Rationalism is there the tradition of philosophy. But in Germany that spirit has been produced by the progress of the century, and is the very centre of thought. Even in the reaction from bare empiricism the historical spirit guards these sciences from the dangers of excessive abstraction, and keeps the philosopher keenly alive to the complexity of the real.

T. W. TAYLOR, JR.

Anarchy or Government? An Inquiry in Fundamental Politics. By WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1895. — pp. vi, 174.

The word 'anarchy,' as found in this title, is used in its literal signification to designate a society without organized form of government. Such a society, Mr. Salter takes pains to show, is a possibility, for numerous approximations thereto may be met with in the annals of the race. Instances are not infrequent of primitive peoples among whom enforcement of respect for personal rights and punishment of wrong-doing were entirely in the hands of the individual himself, or of his family. And the early history of several of our Western states will show that such a condition is not incompatible with the existence of some of the best elements of civilization. Not only is such a state of society possible, it is intrinsically desirable. In the Garden of Eden there were no policemen until it had ceased to be a Paradise. The exercise of constraint is *per se* an evil. It is therefore morally justifiable only when greater evils are thereby avoided, or when more than counterbalancing advantages would otherwise be lost. If all writers on this subject would admit or rather insist upon this point with the emphasis of our author, much of the way would be cleared for further discussion of the subject. Coercion or restraint, then, is a wrong (as well as an evil), except as it finds its justification in some preponderating good. And this is not merely the private opinion of the author; it is the expression of the conscience of all civilized races, proclaimed with unmistakable emphasis by the policy of centuries. Every one might defend himself by his own powers, or he might enter into a voluntary compact with others for mutual assistance, — he might, but he is not allowed to. Should an enemy invade the country, he is not permitted to fight or surrender as he chooses, he may be forced to join the army of defence with the chance of losing his own life. Not merely does society thus act; every one, except a few amiable impossibles like Tolstoi, is ready to affirm its right thus to act. Even that lonely prophet of individualism, Herbert Spencer, admits the justification of so much of coercion. But if I go thus far, how can I possibly refuse to go farther? We have been acting on the principle that the privileges of no member of society are rights to which he has a moral title, when their enjoyment is purchased

at the cost of the more important interests of the whole. If this be admitted for personal security, why will it not hold elsewhere, — in the making of contracts, in the collection of money to defray the expenses of universal education, in the enforcement of regulations touching the marriage state, in the bringing of order out of chaos in the industrial world? No line of principle can be drawn between the one end and the other; if society has the moral right to use force in the one case, it has in the others, and the only question can be how far it is expedient to do so. The consideration of *this* question evidently belongs to the economist and the statesman; and while the author does not fail to make known his own views, he does not dwell on this phase of the subject at length.

Such, in substance, is the argument of Mr. Salter's little book. Within equal space no clearer and more convincing presentation of the moral problem involved in state interference could well be found. To be sure, when we ask why society has the right ever to interfere for any reason whatever with the freedom of the individual, the author's statements become vague, and are often nothing but phrases. Fortunately, however, the argument as he presents it does not need to be carried back to the ultimate ground and nature of social obligation. The citizens of the modern state are practically agreed, did they but know it, in the matter of the principle to be applied. What is that principle, and for what fields of human activity will it hold? These are the only questions he needs to answer, who aims to reach the conscience of the men of action. And this is done in this case so clearly and so satisfactorily, that we feel no disposition to dwell upon minor imperfections. As not merely the statement of an important ethical doctrine, but as emphatically also a tract for the times, we can but wish that this little book might find its way into the hands of every law student and every judge in the United States. For the superstitions which it combats are among the most discouraging features of our public life.

FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP.

Socrates and Athenian Society in his Day. A biographical sketch by A. D. GODLEY, M.A. London, Seeley & Co., 1896. — pp. 232.

Mr. Godley, in a style unusually readable, passes in review the general life of Socrates, touching upon his place in history, his direct relation to the Sophists, his influence upon the young, his electric effect upon the public, the attack made upon him by Aristophanes, and, finally, his condemnation by the Athenian judges. From this sketch he excludes, as far as possible, an examination of philosophic views, saying that while, in the case of Socrates, "it is especially difficult to separate the philosopher from the man," yet the passages chosen "are generally such as bear comparatively little reference to the speculative sides of Socrates' teaching." These extracts from Plato and Aristophanes read so well that any further translations from Mr. Godley's pen would be cordially welcomed. Indeed, his whole style is singularly fresh and pleasant, although once or twice it is not per-